Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. This monograph explores an alternative way of providing a JSOTF headquarters to the Joint Force Commander. Beginning with a history of joint SOF doctrine, the monograph outlines the evolution of special operations command and control and the subsequent need for a standing operational-level headquarters. Having identified this void in capability, the monograph then presents a model for a SJSOTF headquarters possessing a full-time complement of qualified personnel and robust capabilities to conduct special operations across the spectrum of conflict. The monograph then analyzes the SJSOTF headquarters model against evaluation criteria established by USSOCOM.
would be the lead military agency in the war on terrorism:
"SOCOM will function as both a supported and a supporting command. The global nature of the war, the nature of the enemy and the need for fast, efficient operations in hunting down and rooting out terrorist networks have all contributed to the need for an expanded role for Special Operations forces. We are transforming that command to meet that need." 1 Despite this new charter and the dramatic successes in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, USSOCOM continues to conduct operations with antiquated command and control (C2) doctrine. The crux of the problem lies with the joint special operations task force, or JSOTF.
The JSOTF constitutes the operational C2 structure for deployed SOF; it is the focal point where the actions of disparate special operations units (Army Special Forces, Rangers, Navy sea-airland (SEAL) units, Air Force special ops aviation, etc) are planned, synchronized, and executed.
When a Joint Task Force (JTF) is formed, the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) is normally tasked to establish a JSOTF to command and control all SOF in the JTF. the regionally oriented Special Forces Group, Naval Special Warfare Task Unit, National Guard special operations augmentee program, or some other entity. Consequently, JSOTF staff members face a steep "learning curve" upon the headquarters' formation, since in all likelihood they will not have trained or worked together before. This ensuing lack of efficiency and cohesion, at least during the initial stages of the JSOTF's lifespan, causes unnecessary friction and turbulence during the conduct of operations. These are difficulties the SOF community can ill-afford, for conducting world wide counter terrorism (CT), direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID) and other mission sets against a ruthless and cunning enemy requires a truly streamlined C2 structure. 3 As previously mentioned, current joint special operations doctrine calls for the JSOTF to be formed around the nucleus of the TSOC staff. 4 Prior to 9/11, this construct made sense; crises were normally confined to a specific region of the world, thereby making it necessary for the responding JSOTF to have a regional focus. Additionally, operations requiring the deployment of a JSOTF prior to 9/11 were normally of short duration, such as the 1996 non-combatant evacuation (NEO) in Liberia. Executed by a JSOTF drawn from Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR), the operation witnessed the evacuation of 2,115 people to a safe haven in Sierra Leone. 5 Once the evacuation was complete, the JSOTF transferred responsibilities to a conventional JTF and redeployed.
The current threat, however, renders this methodology ineffective. Trans-national terrorist and criminal organizations do not respect national borders, nor do their operations neatly conform to the boundaries of our geographic combatant commands (GCC's). In fact, these groups seek to confound us by operating on the seams of the GCC's, sowing confusion and perhaps even Staff, 1998) , Ibid., p III-1. 5 Henry H. Shelton, "Coming of Age: Theater Special Operations Commands." Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996, p 51. inertia in our C2 architecture. Furthermore, the threat's organizational structure is of a highly complex, cellular nature, often entrenched in the chaotic infrastructure of failed states. The unique nature of the terrorist threat, therefore, calls for C2 structures that are flexible, durable and globally focused.
A likely solution to SOF's command and control dilemma is the standing JSOTF (SJSOTF) headquarters. By forming these headquarters on a permanent basis, SOF would possess a cohesive, well-trained C2 node free from the organizational and administrative problems associated with ad hoc structures. The standing JSOTF is not a novel concept; in fact, many in the SOF community have made the subject an integral part of monographs, position papers, and other professional writings. What is missing is a new approach to the subject of standing JSOTFs, one that reflects an organizational structure in tune with USSOCOM's global mission against terrorism.
This monograph explores an alternative way of establishing a SJSOTF headquarters. It first examines the evolution of joint SOF doctrine and why the current JSOTF construct is inadequate for prosecuting the GWOT. Having established an historical framework for the current state of joint SOF doctrine, the monograph then presents a model for the SJSOTF headquarters. In doing so, the monograph outlines command and control functions, staff organization and roles, and deployment packages. The monograph then analyzes this model against the SOF Attributes outlined in USSOCOM 's 2003-2004 Posture Statement: Precision Strikes and Effects, Tailored and Integrated Operations, Ubiquitous Access, Regional Expertise, C4ISR Dominance, Agile and Unconventional Logistics, and Force Protection and Survivability. 6 SOF's unique ethos and capabilities have made it an important instrument to implement the National Security Strategy of a nation with global commitments and implacable enemies. The operational warfighting piece of this structure, the JSOTF, has proven its worth in the regional crises of the latter part of the twentieth century. However, to defeat the threats of a new century, a new organization with a sense of permanence and a global, expeditionary outlook is required.
The Evolution of Joint SOF Doctrine and the Need for a SJSOTF Headquarters
The unit formed the ground assault force, while the Navy provided the helicopters needed to infiltrate the assaulters and then exfiltrate the rescued hostages. Because the Navy could not produce pilots with enough experience in over-land flight operations, the Marine Corps provided the aircrews for the mission. Even though none of these elements had worked with each other before, the task force leadership curtailed full mission profile rehearsals due to security concerns, thereby worsening an already tenuous state of affairs.
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The hastily formed rescue task force did not fare well under the strain and friction of actual operations. Two helicopters were forced to abandon the mission enroute to the target due to mechanical failure, while a fierce dust storm caused the remainder of the aircraft to arrive fifty minutes late to the rendezvous point known as Desert One. Misfortune continued to plague the mission even on the ground; while transloading the assault force from the C-130's, a third helicopter became disabled due to a burned-out hydraulic pump. With only five operational helicopters remaining to conduct the mission, the task force did not have sufficient aircraft to move the hostages and assault force out of the target area in Teheran. After consulting with the National Command Authority (NCA) via satellite communications, the task force commander made the decision to abort.
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Aborting the operation did not end the task force's misfortunes, however. While hovering to clear the way for a C-130 powering up for take off, a helicopter became disoriented and collided with another aircraft. The ensuing explosions destroyed both aircraft and killed eight men. The survivors loaded in to the remaining C-130's and successfully exfiltrated out of Iran, leaving behind the wrecked aircraft and charred bodies of their comrades.
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Within weeks after the conclusion of Operation RICE BOWL, Congress directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to appoint a commission to "independently appraise the rescue attempt [and] recommend improvements in planning, organizing, coordinating, directing, and controlling any such operations in the future." 12 Officially titled the Special Operations Review Group, the panel became known as the Holloway Commission after its chairman, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James Holloway. Although the commission did not find fault with the men who planned and executed the mission, they identified various problem areas ranging from poorly defined command and control relationships to poor intelligence support and inadequate equipment. As a result of these findings, the Department of Defense created a standing joint counterterrorist task force and a Special Operations Advisory Panel. arrival, yet the first SR and DA elements of the JSOTF did not infiltrate into Iraqi-held territory until late January 1991. 26 This time lag between deployment and major combat operations proved to be more a function of political constraints and the GCC's overall plan than any shortcomings in joint SOF C2, yet it must be considered a factor in SOCCENT's success. With almost six months in theater prior to combat operations, SOCCENT found itself with ample time 24 Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 231. 25 Shelton, 51. 26 Lenahan, Crippled Eagle, 37. to plan and prepare. The JSOTF headquarters, pulled from the various staff sections of SOCCENT, therefore had plenty of opportunity to run staff drills, train personnel, and conduct a myriad of other tasks in order to surmount the traditional friction between peacetime activities and wartime command and control.
Additionally, the employment of joint SOF C2 in crisis response operations during the post-Cold War era also benefited from the element of time. While requiring a faster response time than the build-up associated with the first Persian Gulf War, these operations typically did not last as long. TSOC commanders therefore had the capability to establish and deploy JSOTFs without significant impacts on other TSOC missions. Within 60 to 90 days of the initial deployment, a relief force in the form of a U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit, United Nations peacekeeping force, or some other military entity could be expected to arrive and assume the duties of the JSOTF headquarters, thereby allowing its personnel to resume their "normal" peacetime functions at the TSOC. SOCEUR's 1996 stability and support operations in Liberia are a prime example of this;
within weeks of conducting the NEO operation to Sierra Leone, SOCEUR's JSOTF had transferred responsibility for the operation to a conventional headquarters and re-deployed to Germany.
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The terrorist attacks of September 11 th 2001 called into question this concept of joint SOF C2. Despite the tremendous progress in terms of synchronizing and integrating SOF operations since the Iran rescue mission, SOF's command and control structures still lacked the optimal characteristics to meet a global terrorist threat. Defeating transnational terrorist organizations requires a tremendous degree of durability, responsiveness, and flexibility. Unfortunately, the theater special operations commands did not develop these attributes to their full potential prior to 9/11. Instead, the TSOCs developed a "jack of all trades" mentality; that is, pursuing various 27 Shelton, "Coming of Age: Theater Special Operations Commands", 51.
levels of competence in "full spectrum operations", from peacetime engagement to more traditional combat missions, rather than excellence in warfighting. "The establishment of a JSOTF presents significant organizational, operational, and training challenges. These challenges affect the COMJSOTF (commander, joint special operations task force)'s ability to rapidly fuse a diverse group of key personnel, with varying degrees of understanding and experience in joint SO (special operations), into a functioning JSOTF….the establishment of the JSOTF may impact on the SOC's other missions by the loss of key SOC personnel to the JSOTF."
Research of actions in
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In essence, current doctrine recognizes the inherent shortcomings in SOF command and control, yet can offer no solution to counter this friction other than relying on the skill and acumen of the JSOTF commander (COMJSOTF). Considering the innumerable challenges a COMJSOTF must face in the conduct of operations, forging an effective headquarters staff after a crisis occurs should not be included on that list. The very notion of using an ad hoc C2 structure violates one of the SOF Truths, the core beliefs that characterize the nature of U.S. SOF; that is, "competent special operations forces cannot be created after emergencies occur." 33 Individual U.S. SOF operators and tactical units have certainly met the requirements of this dictum, yet, incongruously, the headquarters directing their actions have not.
According to a study conducted by the National Defense University, 81% of all JTF and JSOTF headquarters have had less than 30 days to prepare before forces deployed into theater.
34
In spite of this trend, SOF continues to function with the same antiquated command and control structures developed during the waning days of the Cold War. The increased operational responsibilities for SOF in the GWOT have further highlighted this void in capability, as well as the need for change. To be successful, SOF must take the next step in its evolution----the formation of a SJSOTF headquarters. Only a standing headquarters with a global, rather than regional, focus offers this degree of flexibility. For example, one plausible scenario might include USSOCOM, as a supported command, employing the SJSOTF to conduct advanced force operations (AFO) or other GWOT activities in a region as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. 44 While technically serving as the "supporting" command at this time, the GCC of the region would actually benefit 43 Ibid. The DoD Dictionary of Military Terms defines administrative control, or ADCON, as " direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations." 44 As of this writing, no universally accepted doctrinal definition of advanced force operations (AFO) exists. CSM Mark Dunham, USA (ret) describes AFO in a 23 December 2002 interview with COL Mike Repass as "Secretary of Defense approved military operations such as clandestine operations, source operations, and deployment of enabling forces and capabilities to conduct target specific preparations prior to the conduct of actual operations." from the economy of force role provided by USSOCOM. Other than providing the required support for the SJSOTF, the GCC, along with its TSOC, would be free to conduct operations in other parts of its AOR.
Once the situation had been developed sufficiently, USSOCOM could then shift to a supporting command, transferring OPCON of the SJSOTF to the GCC. The SJSOTF, having already conducted numerous operations in the AOR, would transition to the control of the GCC's JTF or JFC; in fact, the SOF element, with its longevity and enhanced situational awareness, would most likely play a significant role in the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of other forces into theater. This is but one of the many command and control permutations offered by the SJSOTF headquarters acting in concert with USSOCOM's Title 10 responsibilities.
Organization and Functions of the SJSOTF Headquarters
The SJSOTF headquarters will be, by definition, a joint organization. It will contain the appropriate mix of personnel in order to accomplish all doctrinal SOF missions in any environment---ground, air, and maritime. The SJSOTF headquarters will be a self-contained entity, requiring no outside augmentation for employment. It will not, as Colonel Adams suggests in his Army War College study, serve as the nucleus for a larger JSOTF staff. 45 This requirement will certainly strain SOF's already limited pool of manpower; however, the benefits far outweigh the drawbacks. With a full complement of qualified personnel, the SJSOTF headquarters staff will be able to develop the necessary cohesion and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP's) during pre-crisis activities. The SJSOTF will also operate more efficiently once deployed, having discarded the traditional burdens of training augmentees and integrating them into the organization. 45 Adams, "Forming Standing JSOTFs", 14. Task Force Operations, serves as the current doctrine for the employment of JSOTFs. 46 The SJSOTF will adhere to this doctrinal framework, making modifications as necessary to accommodate mission-related requirements of the GWOT. Figure 3 depicts the organizational structure of the SJSOTF, one that closely resembles that found in Joint Pub 3-05.1.
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Each staff section of the SJSOTF headquarters will share three main characteristics. First, as previously mentioned, each staff section will be fully manned at all times, thereby allowing for both effective training during pre-crisis activities and seamless employment during operations.
Secondly, each staff section will be manned with experienced SOF and SOF-support officers and NCO's who are capable of planning and executing special operations across the full spectrum of conflict. Personnel with no operational SOF background should not be assigned to the SJSOTF The SJSOTF headquarters should be commanded by an 0-7 flag officer (brigadier general or rear admiral, lower half) with previous experience in command of a Special Forces Group, Naval Special Warfare Task Group, Ranger Regiment, or other equivalent SOF organization.
Having an 0-7, rather than an 0-6, command the SJSOTF will give the organization additional clout in terms of rank structure, thereby allowing for greater SOF influence and input when serving under a JTF. An 0-7 SJSOTF commander (COMSJSOTF) will also place the organization on a more equal footing with the regional TSOC, since both the COMSJSOTF and TSOC commander will share the same rank. Dealing with his regional counterpart as a peer rather than as a subordinate will facilitate the COMSJSOTF's role as a supported commander for specific missions.
The increased rank structure of the SJSOTF also adds to the flexibility and agility of the organization. For example, if the need for the SJSOTF to expand into a JTF should arise, the Director of the Center for Special Operations, an 0-8 (major general or rear admiral, upper half), would take command of the organization and the COMSJSOTF would serve as his deputy. In this scenario, the SJSOTF Deputy Commander, an 0-6 (colonel or captain), would subsequently assume command of the JTF's special operations component command. Additionally, should the SJSOTF be broken down into two smaller JSOTFs, the SJSOTF Deputy Commander would take charge of one of these elements.
The SJSOTF J-1 will perform duties as prescribed by Joint Pub 3-05.1, to include oversight of joint personnel planning and operations, joint personnel services coordination and joint manpower management for the SJSOTF. 50 The SJSOTF J-1 will be an 0-5 (lieutenant colonel or commander) with prior experience on a TSOC staff of other SOF-related headquarters.
The SJSOTF J-2 will support the COMSJSOTF by providing intelligence and counterintelligence support to the SJSOTF and attached units. 51 Headed by an 0-5 joint intelligence officer, the J-2 section collects, collates, and analyzes all-source intelligence for all doctrinal SOF missions. The SJSOTF J-2 will maintain a full-time Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) responsible for developing target intelligence packages (TIP), all-source production, collection management and dissemination, and counterintelligence. 52 Additionally, a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) will be attached to the SJSOTF JISE on a full-time basis to provide connectivity to national collection assets during peacetime and crisis planning.
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The J-2 Special Security Officer will maintain a full-time Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility in conjunction with Center for Special Operations Intelligence directorate.
The SJSOTF J-3 is the operational nerve center of the organization. As Joint Pub 3-05.1 dictates, the J-3 "assists the commander in the discharge of assigned responsibility for the direction and control of operations, beginning with planning and follow-through until specific operations are completed." 54 Specifically, the J-3 plans, synchronizes, and executes all aspects of special operations, to include ground, air, maritime, fire support, information operations (IO), space operations, PSYOPS, civil affairs (CA), and personnel recovery.
The J-3, an experienced SOF 0-6, will have several mission-specific cells to assist him.
A staff cell will represent each the functional areas of ground, air, and maritime operations. Normally, a Special Forces or Ranger 0-4 will chair the ground cell, an Air Force special operator or Army special operations aviation 0-4 will head the air cell, and a SEAL or Special Boat 0-4 will supervise the maritime component. Separate IO, CA, PSYOPS cells will contribute to the functional cells as necessary. The deputy J-3, an 0-5, will be responsible for consolidating and synchronizing the efforts of these functional cells into a consolidated course of action.
Additionally, because the SJSOTF will have a global focus, the J-3 section will need to maintain a mix of officers and NCO's with a wide range of regional expertise in order to facilitate operations. down into functional cells, to include medical, transportation, and contracting. In addition, a Logistics Operations Center (LOC) will be established on a full-time basis to serve as the focal point for all supply and logistical support operations. A cross-section of regional and joint expertise will also be important for the J-4 section, since they will have to interface with host nation agencies, naval special warfare combat service support teams (NSW CSST), special operations theater support elements (SOTSE) of the various TSOC's.
Recent operations in Afghanistan and
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The J-5, or plans section, will be headed by an 0-5 with prior experience as a planner on a joint SOF staff. The J-5 section, as stated in Joint Pub 3-05.1, is responsible for deliberate planning for the SJSOTF, coordinating with the J-3 and other sections, and represents the command on JTF planning cells and boards. 58 Like the J-3, the J-5 will be broken down into ground, maritime, and air cells to facilitate detailed planning. In addition, the J-5 will man and run the SJSOTF Joint Planning Group (JPG) that is responsible for directing, synchronizing, and coordinating all deliberate planning for the organization.
The SJSOTF J-6 will be responsible for communications, electronics, and automation support for the SJSOTF. 59 Led by an 0-5 joint signal officer, the J-6 section includes functional cells for joint communications control, automation control, message center, and frequency management. In addition, the J-6 will maintain a robust liaison (LNO) cell to facilitate coordination with other signal providers such as a Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), other government agencies, and host nation service providers.
The SJSOTF LNO cell will be responsible for staffing the various liaison positions to outside agencies required by the SJSOTF. An 0-6 with a SOF aviation background will lead this cell; when deployed, he and the majority of the LNO cell personnel will form the SJSOTF's Unique to the SJSOTF will be the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (HHD). Commanded by an 0-4 (major or lieutenant commander), the HHD will perform the traditional headquarters commandant functions, such as life support, postal support, morale welfare and recreation (MWR) support, and SJSOTF base security. 62 Two subordinate functional detachments, the SJSOTF Signal Detachment and the SJSOTF Service Detachment, round out the HHD (see Figure 4) . The inclusion of these two detachments will give the SJSOTF a more robust ability to deploy quickly, and then conduct sustained operations once in the operational area. 
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The Signal Detachment will also maintain organic multimedia and communications security (COMSEC) sections.
The SJSOTF Support Detachment's functions, like the Signal Detachment, also closely resemble those performed by its Special Forces counterparts. Commanded by an 0-3 logistics officer, the detachment would be responsible for unit-level supply, service and maintenance functions of the SJSOTF headquarters. 65 The detachment would also maintain and operate a small pool of tactical vehicles and material handling equipment (MHE) necessary for SJSOTF operations. During pre-crisis activities, the detachment will be responsible for configuring and maintaining SJSOTF equipment in appropriate deployment packages. When deployed, the Support Detachment would establish and operate the SJSOTF Support Center (SUPCEN). from primitive desert airstrips to U.S. Navy vessels. Accordingly, the SJSOTF headquarters must possess the same degree of flexibility, yet must not sacrifice responsiveness while achieving it.
Force modularity is the key to achieving this goal. As defined by the DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, a force module is "a grouping of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, with their accompanying supplies and the required nonunit supply and personnel necessary to sustain forces for a minimum of 30 days." 67 The SJSOTF headquarters will tailor its deployment packages along these lines in order to respond to any possible contingency.
Deployment Package "A" (DP-A) will consist of the full SJSOTF headquarters and its organic support elements. DP-A will be employed when the SJSOTF is required to operate in a relatively mature theater in which support infrastructure and facilities are in place. For example, the SJSOTF, as part of a JTF, deploys to an intermediate staging base (ISB) located on a welldeveloped military airfield in a country bordering the joint operations area (JOA).
68
Deployment Package "B" (DP-B) will consist of the full SJSOTF headquarters, its organic support elements, and any required support augmentation. DP-B will be employed when the SJSOTF is required to operate in an undeveloped theater with no dedicated theater support structure in place at the time of deployment. DP-B may also be employed when the SJSOTF is operating independent of a JFC or JTF, or when USSOCOM is functioning as a supported command for a particular mission. The augmentation force may be elements of 528 th Special
Operations Support Battalion, the theater SOTSE, the theater support command, or a combination of these elements. th SOSB is responsible for providing logistical and maintenance support to deployed ARSOF units. 70 Adams," Forming Standing JSOTFs", 12.
An Analysis of the SJSOTF Headquarters
Any attempt at restructuring JSOTF doctrine must align with USSOCOM's transformation efforts in order to gain broad acceptance throughout the SOF community. Precision Strike and Effects, as described by the USSOCOM Posture Statement, is the ability to "perform precision strikes and achieve scaleable lethal or non-lethal effects by rapidly characterizing and tracking targets and exploiting organic, national, and international systems as well as employing any other means or methods available." 72 While the responsibility for delivering precision effects will be, for the most part, the realm of the individual SOF operator and team, the SJSOTF headquarters can also play a significant role. For example, the imbedded NIST within the J-2 section will provide timely and continuous access to national-level intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. This unique connectivity will give the SJSOTF headquarters and its subordinate units increased fidelity on potential targets and decreased "sensor to shooter" times. When combined with the SJSOTF's organic human intelligence (HUMINT) and special reconnaissance capabilities, the NIST offers an unparalleled holistic view of the battlefield.
71 USSOCOM, USSOCOM Posture Statement, 66. 72 Ibid., 66.
Additionally, the staff cohesion found in a full-time organization such the SJSOTF headquarters will facilitate the precise tracking and engagement of enemy targets. Today's ad hoc JSOTF headquarters are usually compelled to devote a great deal of time to staff training and familiarization after their activation. In contrast, the SJSOTF headquarters will possess wellrehearsed and understood standard operating procedures (SOPs), having had ample opportunity to exercise them during the element's annual training. SJSOTF staff members will develop relationships based on trust and mutual understanding forged from the stress of numerous training evolutions and practice deployments. These strong interpersonal bonds will allow for a more timely and efficient execution of the SJSOTF targeting cycle, since no time will be spent on getting the staff "up to speed." These benefits can therefore be leveraged during pre-crisis activities. Since the SJSOTF headquarters has all of its staff sections fully manned and trained, it can devote its energies to analyzing the expected JOA, developing TIPs, and other critical tasks related to the application of precision effects.
The next attribute, Tailored and Integrated Operations, is described by the USSOCOM Posture Statement as:
"SOF units and individuals must adapt quickly to changing mission requirements, objectives and operating environments. They can rapidly and effectively combined competencies and modify organizations to accomplish a variety of missions with autonomy. SOF transform and reshape organizational design and force structure to ensure effective collaboration in joint, interagency, and combined operational environments, to include work with indigenous forces, non-governmental and international organizations and local civilian entities." "…have access to and can potentially influence events or conduct overt or clandestine operations on demand. SOF conduct operations in all environments; land, air, sea, subsurface, space, and in areas denied to conventional forces because of political or threat conditions. Access includes an appropriate forward presence, as well as the ability to mobilize and project quickly from continental United States (CONUS) or outside continental United States (OCONUS) basing." EBO is defined by USJFCOM as "actions that change the state of a system to achieve directed policy aims using the integrated application of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power." ONA, a key enabler of EBO, is defined as "the integration of people, processes, and tools that use multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build shared knowledge of the adversary, the environment, and ourselves." 75 USSOCOM,USSOCOM Posture Statement, 67.
Again, the SJSOTF headquarters, by employing its mission-tailored deployment packages, can deploy quickly and operate from a wide variety of locations. While the SJSOTF headquarters does not possess an organic forcible entry capability, it can nevertheless operate in the most austere environments once a lodgment is secured. 76 More importantly, the SJSOTF headquarters' ability to operate from a sea-based platform negates most of the threat's anti-access systems and provides the JFC a greater degree of flexibility in SOF employment.
Regional Expertise, Presence, and Influence are defined as the ability to "conduct and influence operations anywhere, with minimal restrictions, through an extensive personal understanding and a network of relationships throughout the region." 77 More than any other, the SJSOTF headquarters falls short in satisfying the requirements of this attribute. Because it is globally focused, the SJSOTF headquarters will lack the regional expertise and cultural understanding characteristic of the TSOC's and other SOF tactical units. This reduced capability could prove problematic during the conduct of several SOF missions, most notably UW and FID.
Both these activities require an intimate knowledge of the language, history, customs, and institutions of the operational area, often gained through years of constant engagement, in-country training, and combined exercises.
The SJSOTF headquarters' lack of regional expertise could be remedied by attaching selected personnel from the TSOC's. provides an enhanced information collection capability with its organic NIST. While many current JSOTFs are allocated NISTs once they deploy to an operational area, they do not possess the same interoperability and cohesion found in an SJSOTF headquarters with a full-time national intelligence reach-back capability. NIST personnel of the SJSOTF headquarters would have developed firm working relationships with the COMSJSOTF and his uniformed staff due to continuous, daily interaction. The COMSJSOTF could employ these strong ties during pre-crisis activities to build a robust database on the operational area, which could then be expanded and refined once the SJSOTF headquarters deployed.
Decision support would also be enhanced in the SJSOTF headquarters. Once again, the intangibles of unit cohesion and continuous personal interaction would play a major role in assisting the commander in making decisions. Key staff members, in particular the J3, J2, and J5, would know the COMSJSOTF's "battle rhythm", or daily cycle of significant events, intimately.
They would understand, after numerous training exercises and practice deployments, how the COMSJSOTF requires information to be presented in order to facilitate efficient decisionmaking. The importance of this factor cannot be overstated. As a matter of course, the SJSOTF headquarters will field the latest automated command and control equipment, yet it is the human element that will provide the marked advantage. During SJSOTF operations, information would be collected from all sources, analyzed and processed into actionable intelligence, and then tailored to fit the decision-making needs of the COMSJSOTF and his subordinate commanders. Unconventional logistics, however, poses a larger challenge. The implications of unconventional logistics point to independence from conventional support, and therefore an increased reliance on host-nation and interagency providers. Here again, the SJSOTF headquarters' global, rather than regional, focus may impede its efforts. Without an in-depth knowledge of the target region, SJSOTF logisticians would find it difficult to leverage indigenous sources of supply. As with their counterparts in operations and intelligence, the SJSOTF J-4 section could be augmented with area experts from the TSOC, SOTSE, or regionally oriented tactical SOF units. Again, this would offer only a temporary solution, for these key personnel would most likely not be made available to SJSOTF headquarters until just prior to its deployment. 80 Ibid., 68.
In describing Force Protection and Survivability, the USSOCOM Posture Statement reads:
"SOF personnel enhance physical survivability through education, training, and experience. SOF elements employ stealth, speed, and countermeasures to ensure survivability. SOF personnel employ signature management measures and technology, equipment (including weapons), electronic and C2 systems and networks that possess features that ensure survivability regardless of the operating environment and conditions."
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While stealth and speed may be characteristics more commonly attributed to SOF tactical units, the SJSOTF headquarters would certainly use the education, training, and experience of its personnel to ensure force protection and survivability. Accordingly, the SJSOTF headquarters staff will be made up of mostly senior officers and NCO's, with the vast majority having multiple assignments as operators in SOF tactical units. The staff's degree of personal lethality and operational "street smarts" would therefore be very high.
In addition to the high degree of survivability at the individual level among the SJSOTF staff, the extensive pre-deployment training and rehearsals conducted by the organization will also play a key role in providing force protection and survivability. As a result of this training, the SJSOTF headquarters would have established drills or "play books" to respond to various contingencies, such as vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks, civil unrest, and downed aircraft. These procedures would be well understood by every member of the SJSOTF staff and constantly updated to remain abreast of the current threat. An ad hoc JSOTF, with its personnel focused on simply getting to know each other, much less complicated staff procedures, would not have this capability.
Conclusion
The SJSOTF headquarters model is, for the most part, aligned with the SOF Attributes outlined in the USSOCOM Posture Statement. Its shortcomings in regional orientation are 81 Ibid., 68.
significant, yet can be temporarily ameliorated with some stopgap measures. While the lack of regional expertise and qualified personnel certainly pose challenges to the future of the SJSOTF concept, its global orientation does not. Recent events have shown that our most implacable enemies have a global, rather than a regional focus; they will strike wherever and wherever in order to achieve their goals. It is therefore only fitting for USSOCOM, the U.S. military's lead agency in fighting the GWOT, to also think globally and employ command and control structures that can operate in any conditions. Inherent to this concept of global response is the ability to deploy quickly and operate efficiently once in the operational area. Our current model of JSOTF organization and structure clearly does not possess these qualities. All too often, U.S. SOF has thrown together operationallevel headquarters at the eleventh hour, mixing and matching disparate, unfamiliar elements to form a semi-coherent whole. Given these sub-optimal conditions, the success of these haphazardly assembled C2 nodes is a tribute to the determination, intelligence, flexibility, adaptability and endurance of the officers and NCO's manning their respective staffs. U.S. SOF must do better. Its history has been one of exemplary innovation and evolution; now is the time to take the next step. A standing operational-level headquarters will fill the void in SOF C2 capability, providing a durable link between the tactical excellence of the SOF operator and the strategic goals of the Nation he serves. The unprecedented scourge of transnational terrorism and the threat it poses to U.S. national interests have provided the necessary momentum for change. The SOF community must take advantage of these conditions and quickly transform in order to remain the force of choice against terror.
